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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3)(j). This
appeal was transferred from the Court of Appeals to the Utah Supreme Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review on an appeal from the granting of a motion for summary
judgment is that the Supreme Court accords no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions
of law which are reviewed for correctness. See Schurtz v. BMW of No. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d
1108 (Utah 1991). The reviewing court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any
ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied upon below. See Higgins v. Salt
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At all times relevant to this matter, the plaintiff was an insured of Bear River Mutual
Insurance (herinafter, "Bear River")for personal injury protection ("PIP") coverage in the
amount of $3000.00. On November 8, 1995, the plaintiff was involved in an automobile
accident. (R. 1-8). Sometime thereafter, the plaintiff filed a claim with Bear River under his
PIP policy.
Prior to May 12,1997, Bear River paid PIP benefits to the plaintiff s medical providers
in the amount of $1921.34. (R. 54-55). On May 12, 1997, at Bear River's request, the
plaintiff underwent an independent medical evaluation ("IME") performed by Dr. Stephen
Marble. In Dr. Marble's report, he recommended that treatment after twelve weeks was not
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reasonable or necessary. Accordingly, PIP payments by Bear River were discontinued. (R.
61-67).
On August 11,1997, plaintiff filed a complaint against Bear River for causes of action
including breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and the tort of violation of public policy embodied in
the No Fault Insurance Act. (R. 1-8). Bear River filed a motion for partial summary judgment
asking the court to dismiss all of plaintiff s claims except for that of breach of contract. (R.
164-65). Briefs were submitted on the matter and oral argument was heard. (R. 144-88).
On April 1, 1998, Judge William A. Thorne signed an order granting defendant's
motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed all of plaintiff s claims except for that
of breach of contract. (R. 189-93). On April 16, 1998, although liability for the remainder of
plaintiffs PIP claims was still in dispute, Bear River paid the remainder of the plaintiffs PIP
claims up to the plaintiffs policy limit of $3000.00. (R. 208-13).
Bear River then filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss plaintiffs
remaining breach of contract clam as the full policy limits had been paid. This motion was
denied without explanation or oral argument. The court also ruled that the plaintiff was
entitled to interest was not entitled to the payment of attorney's fees.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to amend his complaint, seeking to revive causes of
action that had been dismissed, and seeking to turn the matter into a class action. (R. 270272). The plaintiff also sought a reconsideration of the court's denial of an attorney fee
award. In response, defendant filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. (R. 424-425). After oral
2

argument, Judge L.A. Dever denied plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint and requested
that the plaintiff file an affidavit regarding attorney's fees. Plaintiff filed the affidavit to
which the defendant objected. (R. 495-505, 508-514).
On February 27,2001, Judge Dever entered a final order of dismissal and granted the
plaintiff attorney's fees of $450.00, plus interest and costs totalling $882.15. (R.528). Bear
River paid the amount ordered by the court, and the plaintiff filed his notice of appeal on
March 26, 2001.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

At all times relevant to this matter, the Plaintiff was an insured of Bear River

Mutual Insurance Company ("Bear River") for personal injury protection ("PIP") coverage
of$3,000.00.(R.190).
2.

On November 8, 1995, the Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident.

(R. 1-8).
3.

Prior to May 12, 1997, Bear River paid PIP benefits in the amount of

$l,924.34.(R.54-55).
4.

On May 12, 1997, the Plaintiff underwent an independent medical

examination with Dr. Stephen Marble as requested by Bear River. (R. 61-67).
5.

Dr. Marble recommended that further treatment was unnecessary.

Accordingly, PIP payments by Bear River were discontinued. (R. 66).
6.

On August 11, 1997, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against Bear River for a

cause of action for breach of insurance contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and
3

fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and the tort of violation of
public policy embodied in the No Fault Insurance Act. (R. 1-8).
7.

Bear River filed a motion for partial summary judgment asking the Court to

dismiss all of Plaintiff s claims except for that of breach of contract. (R. 164-65).
8.

Briefs were submitted on the matter and oral argument was heard. (R. 144-

9.

On April 1, 1998, Judge William Thorne signed an order granting Bear

88).

River's motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed all of plaintiff s claims except
for that of breach of contract. (R. 189-93).
10.

On April 16, 1998, although liability for the remainder of plaintiff s PIP

claims was still in dispute, Bear River paid the remainder of the PIP claims up to the
policy limit. (R. 208-13).
11.

On March 10, 2000, Bear River tendered a check to Garrett Prince for the

amount of interest on the PIP claims under the No Fault Insurance Act. This check was
not accepted by Plaintiffs counsel and was returned to defense counsel's office.
12.

On February 16, 2000, Bear River filed a motion for summary judgment

seeking to dismiss plaintiffs remaining breach of contract claim as the full policy limits of
the PIP policy had been paid. (R. 202-03).
13.

Briefs were submitted by both parties, but no argument was heard. (R. 204-

13,219-31).
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14.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied without explanation.

(R. 234-35).
15.

On October 2, 2000, the trial court entered a Minute Entry decision, ruling

that the plaintiff was entitled to interest on $1,100 from August 7, 1997 to April 6, 1998,
but was not entitled to the payment of attorney's fees. ( R. 268-69).
16.

On November 8, 2000, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint,

seeking to revive causes of action that had been dismissed, and seeking to turn the matter
into a class action. The plaintiff also sought a reconsideration of the court's denial of an
attorney fee award.(R. 270-272).
17.

In response, Bear River filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. (R. 424-425).

18.

On January 12, 2001, oral argument was held and Judge L.A. Dever denied

plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint and asked the plaintiff to file an affidavit
regarding attorney's fees.
19.

On January 28, 2001, the plaintiff filed an affidavit for attorney's fees to

which the defendant objected. (R. 495-505, 508-514).
20.

On February 27, 2001, Judge Dever entered a final order of dismissal and

granted the plaintiff attorney's fees of $450.00, plus interest and costs totalling $882.15.
(R.528).
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21.

Bear River paid the amount ordered by the trial court.

22.

On March 26, 2001, the plaintiff filed his notice of appeal. (R. 531-532).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Judge Thome and Judge Dever's rulings were consistent and correct. Judge Thome
properly granted Bear River's motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs claims
for bad faith, infliction of emotional distress and fraud with prejudice. In doing so, Judge
Thome correctly concluded as a matter of law that "Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-307
imposes a 'reasonable and necessary' standard for determining the payment of PIP benefits."
(R. 191). Moreover, the trial court also properly held that "when a claim is fairly debatable,
the insurer is entitled to debate it, whether the debate concerns a matter of fact or law". (R.
192). The trial court correctly ruled that plaintiffs claims in this matter were fairly debatable,
as such, that decision should stand.
After Judge Thome granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed
all claims but that of breach of contract, the case was transferred to Judge Dever. The
plaintiff then attempted to re-argue the same issues that had been decided by Judge Thome
through a motion to amend the complaint. Like Judge Thome, Judge Dever made the
appropriate legal conclusions and denied plaintiffs motion to amend. Furthermore, Judge
Dever was correct in ruling that the plaintiff was only entitled to a limited amount of

6

attorney's fees in the underlying case. Both Judge Thorne and Judge Dever ruled correctly at
the trial court level and their rulings should be upheld by this Court.
ARGUMENT
I.

"REASONABLE AND NECESSARY" IS A RECOGNIZED STANDARD USED
FOR DETERMINING PAYMENT OF PIP BENEFITS.
The requirement that medical expenses be "reasonable and necessary" is a recognized

standard for payment of PIP benefits throughout Utah as well as the United States. Contrary
to the plaintiffs assertions, the "reasonable and necessary" standard is not a standard that Bear
River created for purposes of this lawsuit.
U.C.A. § 31A-22-307 provides as follows:
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits
include: (a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary
medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including
prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not
to exceed a total of $3,000 per person;... .(emphasis added)
Plaintiff attempts to create his own interpretation of the Utah No-Fault statute.
Essentially, plaintiff would like this Court to rule that the No-Fault statute requires insurance
companies to pay for all incurred expenses within the $3,000 statutory limit no matter if such
expenses are justified. Plaintiff has cited no support whatsoever for this position. Instead,
he ignores the clear and straight forward language contained in the above statute. Further,
plaintiff ignores Utah case law which has held that the Utah No-Fault Act "both in its

statement of general purpose, and its specific provisions, was not intended to provide an
automatic reward or a 'windfall' for being involved in an accident by requiring payment when
there was no loss actually suffered, nor for any expense not reasonably to be incurred, but
should be construed in conformity with the fundamental principle of insurance law, that the
purpose of insurance is to indemnify for losses or damages suffered, as contrasted to gambling
for a munificent reward if a loss occurs." Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 559 P.2d 958
(Utah 1977); see also, Versluis v. Guaranty National Companies, 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992).

Although Utah case law is not available regarding the requirement of reasonable and
necessary medical expenses, case law from other jurisdictions having similar statutory
provisions proves extremely helpful in this matter. For example, in Elkins v. New Jersey
Manufacturers Ins. Co., 583 A.2d 409 (N.J. 1990), the New Jersey Superior Court addressed
the provisions contained in the New Jersey No-Fault Act. In that case, the court stated that
"the act is to be liberally construed to effect the prompt and efficient payment of benefits for
victims of auto accidents." Id. at 700. However, the court further went on to hold that
"notwithstanding this requirement, however, in order to be compensable such medical
expenses must be both reasonable and necessary." Id.
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Similarly, in Nasser v. Auto Club Ins. Assoc, 457 N.W.2d 637 (Mich. 1990), the court
discussed the reasonable and necessary standard under the Michigan No-Fault Act. The court
determined that under the No-Fault Act, "an insurer is not liable for any medical expense to
the extent that it is not a reasonable charge for a particular product or service, or if the product
or service itself is not reasonably necessary. The plain and unambiguous language of § 3107
makes both reasonableness and necessary explicit...." Id. at 645.
Even the case of Miskofsky v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 497 A.2d 223 (N.J. Sup.L. 1984),
which the plaintiff cited to the trial court in his own summary judgment memorandum
provides that under the New Jersey No-Fault Statute, medical expenses must be "reasonable
and necessary". Id. at 231.
Under the Utah No-Fault statute, personal injury protection covers reasonable and
necessary medical expenses. The language contained in the statute is not contradictory,
unclear or confusing. Accordingly, the trial court's decision finding that section 31A-22-307
statute applies the "reasonable and necessary" standard for determining payment of PIP
benefits should be affirmed.

9

II.

THE BEAR RIVER POLICY REQUIRES MEDICAL EXPENSES TO BE
REASONABLE AND NECESSARY.
At all times material herein, plaintiff was an insured of Bear River Mutual. The Bear

River policy sets forth the terms of the agreement entered into between Bear River and the
plaintiff. Page 6 of the Bear River policy provides as follows:
Part B — Personal Injury Protection Coverage.
Insuring Agreement
The company will pay personal injury protection benefits that are
reasonable and necessary to or on behalf of each eligible injured
person for: (a) medical expenses (b) work loss (c) funeral
expenses (d) survivor loss and (e) special damages . . . .
(Emphasis added)(R. 110).
Further, page 7 of the Bear River policy provides as follows:
Definitions.
5. Medical expenses: The reasonable value of all
expenses for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, dental,
rehabilitation (which includes prosthetic devices),
ambulance, hospital and nursing services;
(Emphasis added)(R. 111).
Finally, on page 8 of the policy, the following provision is stated:
Policy period, territory, other limits of liability and special
provisions
4. If the covered person incurs medical expenses which
are unreasonable or unnecessary, we may refuse to pay for
those medical expenses and contest them. Unreasonable
10

medical expenses are fees for medical services which are
higher than the usual and customary charges for those
services; unnecessary medical expenses are fees for
medical services which are not usually and customarily
performed for treatment of the injury, including fees for
an excessive number, amount, or duration of medical
services. (R. 112).
It is an uncontested fact that the plaintiff, at all material times, was a Bear River
insured. In order to obtain insurance coverage from Bear River, the plaintiff entered into a
contractual agreement with the company. The insurance policy memorializes that agreement.
From the clear language of the policy, the reasonable and necessary standard for payment of
medical expenses under PIP coverage is set forth. Accordingly, plaintiff entered into a
contractual relationship in which he agreed to the reasonable and necessary standard for
payment of medical expenses under PIP coverage. Therefore, the trial court was correct in
recognizing that the "reasonable and necessary" standard should be used for determining
payment of PIP benefits. Such a finding should be affirmed by this Court.
A.

Independent Medical Evaluations Determine the
Reasonableness and Necessity of Medical Expenses.

Although Utah courts have not dealt with the issue, courts in other jurisdictions have
discussed an insurer's right to have an independent medical evaluation ("IME") performed in
order to determine the reasonableness and necessity of incurred medical expenses. For
example, in Neal v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 529 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. 1995), State Farm
11

provided personal injury protection coverage for its insured. After its insured was involved
in an automobile accident, State Farm notified her that it had scheduled an independent
medical examination to determine whether or not ongoing chiropractic care was reasonable
and necessary. When the plaintiff failed to attend or provide any reason for not attending the
IME, State Farm suspended payment of further no-fault benefits. In that case, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that while the Minnesota No-Fault Act was enacted in order to assure
prompt payment of PIP benefits without regard to fault, it did not mean that PIP coverage was
intended to provide a PIP claimant with a "blank check". Id. at 33. The court further held that
in many cases, it would be impossible for an insurer to determine whether a PIP claimant's
expenses were "reasonable" and for "necessary" services if the insurer could not require that
the claimant be examined by a physician of its choice. Id. (citing Huntt v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins., 527 A.2d 1333, 1335 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987), cert, den., 533 A.2d 1307 (Md.
Dec. 9th 1987). Further, in Huntt, supra, the court further expounded on an insurer's right to
have an IME performed. In that case, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland stated:
. . . In order to make an informed decision as to whether a PIP
claim should be paid, an insurer is entitled to the benefit of
having a claimant examined by someone other than his or her
own treating physicians. Although disagreements between
physicians as to the best course of treatment for a particular
injury are not uncommon, we do not think the legislature
intended that the opinion of the claimant's physician should be
conclusive in every case. Nor do we think the legislature
12

intended that insurance companies should be left unprotected
against unreasonable PIP claims.
Id. at 1335. Accordingly, the court affirmed the right of an insurance company to demand that
a PIP claimant submit to a physical examination by a physician selected and paid by the
insurer.
In the present case, Bear River exercised its right to have the plaintiff undergo an IME
by Dr. Stephen Marble. The purpose of having an IME was to determine whether or not
medical expenses were reasonable and necessary. Plaintiff asserts that Bear River is not
entitled to rely on the IME report submitted by Dr. Marble. Essentially, plaintiff argues that
it is all right for him to rely on his doctor's opinions, but Bear River is not allowed to rely on
its physician's opinions. Such an assertion creates a double standard which is unjust. As such,
this Court must affirm the trial court's decision that independent medical examinations can
be used to determine the reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses.
B.

Medical Treatment after Twelve Weeks Was Not
Reasonable and Necessary.

On May 12,1997, Dr. Stephen Marble performed an independent medical evaluation
of the plaintiff. Dr. Marble is a board-certified physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist
in Utah, Alaska, Wyoming, Arizona and California. He is the medical director of Healthsouth
Rehabilitation Hospital of Utah where he also serves as president of the medical staff. Dr.
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Marble belongs to a number of professional associations and has been involved in a great deal
of medical research. (R. 114-15).
After review of the plaintiffs history, medical records, and after performing a thorough
physical examination, Dr. Marble prepared a report regarding his findings. (R. 61 -67). In his
report, Dr. Marble stated as follows:
By the time Mr. Prince presented to Dr. Howard for chiropractic
care, he would have been considered presenting with a
complicated spine injury, owing to the delay in treatment
initiation. As such, a maximum of 12 weeks of chiropractic care
could have been justified. I do not think that the chiropractic
care exceeding 12 weeks was medically necessary. No further
chiropractic care should continue. The chiropractic care has been
palliative rather than curative. The patient was only getting up
to two days of pain relief with these treatments, but there has
been no long-term benefit. Following such a whiplash injury, a
multi-disciplinary consultation should have been obtained within
12 weeks from treatment initiation, rather than waiting six
months, as was the case here.
(R. 66).
According to Dr. Marble's report, chiropractic care exceeding 12 weeks was not
medically necessary. Based on that fact, Bear River discontinued the payment of PIP benefits
after the 12-week cutoff period. (R. 53-54). Bear River relied on the IME report of Dr.
Marble to determine whether or not plaintiffs medical expenses were reasonable and
necessary. Based on the report, it made a determination as to when necessary expenses had

14

ceased. Bear River had every right to rely on Dr. Marble's report, and did so in good faith.
Plaintiff claims that because he was still in pain, treatment which he underwent was
necessary. Case law has held, however, that such an argument is not valid. For example, in
Perun v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 655 A.2d 99 (N.J. 1994), the court found that "the fact that pain
continues as a result of a permanent injury does not invariably make such costs 'reasonable1
or 'necessary' medical expenses." To satisfy the requisite as to whether the medical expense
incurred was necessary, one must examine the need for the treatment. Id. at 286. The court
therefore stressed that in determining what is reasonable and necessary, the determining point
is not the individual's desires or what he thinks to be most beneficial. Rather, it is what is
shown by sufficient evidence to be reasonable and necessary to cure and relieve him. Id.
In the present case, Bear River relied on sufficient competent evidence to determine
that after 12 weeks, plaintiffs medical treatment was not reasonable and necessary. Dr.
Marble's report provided this evidence, and such was relied on by Bear River. Because Dr.
Marble determined that after 12 weeks, medical treatment was not necessary, Bear River was
entitled to discontinue PIP benefits. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's
decision in determining that Bear River relied on sufficient competent evidence that after 12
weeks, plaintiffs medical treatment was not reasonable and necessary.

15

III.

BEAR RIVER DID NOT BREACH ITS CONTRACT WITH THE PLAINTIFF
The trial court was correct in holding that Bear River did not breach its contract with

the plaintiff. Bear River satisfied all of its obligations under its insurance contract with the
plaintiff. Once policy limits were paid, plaintiffs claims became moot and a dismissal of the
plaintiffs breach of contract claim was proper.
At all times relevant to this matter, the plaintiff was a Bear River insured for PIP
coverage in the amount of $3000.00. On November 8,1995, the plaintiff was involved in an
automobile accident, and sometime thereafter, made claims to Bear River under his PIP
policy.
Prior to May 12,1997, Bear River paid PIP benefits to the plaintiff s medical providers
in the amount of $1921.34. (R. 54-55). OnApril 16,1998, although liability for the remainder
of plaintiff s PIP claims was still in dispute, Bear River paid the remainder of the PIP claims
up to the policy limit of $3000.00. (R. 208-213).
Bear River satisfied its obligation under the plaintiffs insurance policy. As such, any
claims for breach of contract are moot.
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IV.

BEAR RIVER DID NOT FAIL TO ASSERT PROPER AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES
The plaintiff has argued that Bear River's position regarding the "fairly debatable''

standard under first-party bad faith actions was inappropriate, as affirmative defenses were
not raised in defendant's answer to the original complaint. Plaintiff, however, cites no
authority stating that the "fairly debatable" standard under bad faith cases is an affirmative
defense which must be pled. The fairly debatable standard is a standard of law which the
court should consider in the context of a summary judgment memorandum.
Similarly, although Bear River did not specifically denote the fact that the plaintiff
raised a cause of action in its complaint which does not exist, Bear River did allege as its first
defense that defendant's "complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted."
(R. 11-19).
Assuming, arguendo, that these arguments are affirmative defenses which must be
pled, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
is not a hard and fast rule to be ignored in a vacuum. For example, in Erie v. St. Benedict }s
Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court stated the following:
It is true, as plaintiff insists that Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P., requires that
affirmative defenses be pleaded. It is a good rule whose purpose
is to have the issues to be tried fairly framed. But it is not the
only rule in the book of Rules of Civil Procedure. They must all
be looked to in light of their even more fundamental purpose of
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liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that the
parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute.
What they are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an
opportunity to meet them. When this is accomplished, that is all
that is required. Our rules provide for liberality to allow
examination into settlement of all issues bearing upon the
controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other party to have a
reasonable time to meet a new issue if he so requests. Rule 15(b)
U.R.C.P. so states. Id. at 1192.
At the trial court level, Bear River brought to the attention of the plaintiff, as well as
the court, the fact that Bear River should not be subjected to bad faith litigation because the
plaintiffs PIP claims were fairly debatable. Similarly, Bear River brought to the attention of
the plaintiff and the court that plaintiff raised a cause of action which did not exist. This
action by Bear River was sufficient to put the plaintiff on notice that he must respond to such
issues. Therefore, the trial court's ruling that Bear River did not fail to assert proper
affirmative defenses should be affirmed.
A.

The Fairly Debatable Standard Applies in the Present Case.

Plaintiff attempts to create his own law in this case by concluding that the fairly
debatable standard applies only in cases of fraud or failure of coverage. He cites no authority
for this proposition, and in fact ignores Utah case law which is nearly identical to the present
case which completely adopts the fairly debatable standard.
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In Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263 (Utah App. 1993), the plaintiff was
involved in an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was insured by
Allstate. Following the accident, the plaintiff was able to return to work. However, seven
months later, the plaintiff began to experience medical problems arising from the accident.
Consequently, the plaintiff sought to recover from Allstate lost income benefits pursuant to
the Utah No-Fault statute. Allstate paid for 22 weeks of lost income, but denied the remainder
of plaintiff s claim, responding that the 52 consecutive week period denoted in the no-fault
statute ran from the date of the accident. The plaintiff later filed an action against Allstate,
claiming breach of contract and bad faith failure to make payments under an insurance
contract. Allstate moved to dismiss the plaintiffs claims and the plaintiff filed a motion for
partial summary judgment. Allstate's motion was treated as a motion for summary judgment
and was granted by the trial court. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals overturned
Allstate's summary judgment in part, determining that the plaintiff was in fact entitled to the
full 52 weeks of lost income benefits. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the motion
for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs claims of bad faith. In support of its holding,
the Court of Appeals stated:
It is well settled that an insurer is entitled to challenge its
obligations under an insurance contract as long as such claim is
"fairly debatable." Moreover, when a claim is fairly debatable,
the insurer is entitled to debate it, whether the debate concerns a
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matter of fact or law. The reason for such a rule is plain: It
would not comport with our ideas of either law or justice to
prevent any party who entertains bonafide questions about his
legal obligations from seeking adjudication thereon in the courts.
Id. at 266 (citations omitted).
The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that as a matter of law, Allstate's position was fairly
debatable, and that the plaintiffs claim for bad faith failure to make payments under an
insurance contract must fail.
In the present case, the fairly debatable standard is applicable. Bear River presented
to the trial court the report of Dr. Marble, as well as letters written by Bear River to the
plaintiff detailing how Bear River relied upon Dr. Marble's report in its discontinuance of PIP
benefits. Bear River presented evidence that the plaintiffs claims were fairly debatable. As
such, the trial court held that "when a claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate
it. . . Plaintiffs claims in this matter were fairly debatable." (R. 192). Therefore, this Court
should affirm the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s bad faith claims.
B.

The Plaintiffs Bad Faith Claims Were Property Dismissed
under the "Fairly Debatable" Standard.

It is well settled under Utah law that an insurer is entitled to challenge its obligations
under an insurance contract as long as such claims are "fairly debatable". Larsen, 857 P.2d
at 266. Utah's adoption of the fairly debatable approach follows the well-accepted majority
position. See 14 Couch on Insurance § 207:4 (1999).
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If a claim brought by an insured is fairly debatable, the insurer has an absolute
privilege to debate it and in doing so does not breach the covenant of good faith that is
implied in the contract of insurance. See Billings v. Union Bankers Insurance Co., 918 P.2d
461, 465 (Utah 1996); see also, Calliowc v. Progressive Insurance Co., 745 P.2d 838 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987), (stating that "if the evidence presented creates a factual issue as to the claim's
validity, there exists a debatable reason for denial, thereby legitimizing the denial of the claim,
and eliminating the bad faith claim").
The Utah Court of Appeals has applied the "fairly debatable" standard in the PIP arena
in the case of Larsen v. Allstate Insurance Co., 857 P.2d 263 (Utah App. 1993), discussed
above. In the present case, the fairly debatable standard is applicable. The plaintiff was
evaluated by Dr. Marble who determined that certain portions of the plaintiffs treatment was
unreasonable and/or unnecessary. As such, Bear River relied upon Dr. Marble's report and
denied a portion of PIP benefits. Bear River's reliance upon Dr. Marble's report establishes
a fairly debatable standard which mandates a dismissal of plaintiffs bad faith claims.
Therefore, the trial court was correct in dismissing the plaintiffs claims for bad faith and this
Court should affirm that decision.
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V.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S BAD FAITH
CLAIMS
Although plaintiff attempts to argue that the present case deals with a third-party

situation, case law clearly holds that the relationship between Bear River and the plaintiff is
first party in nature. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). The court
in Beck stated as follows:
We use the term "first party" to refer to an insurance agreement
where the insurer agrees to pay claims submitted to it by the
insured for losses suffered by the insured. The present case
involves such a first-party situation. In contrast, a "third- party"
situation is one where the insurer contracts to defend the insured
against claims made by third parties against the insured and to
pay any resulting liability, up to the specified dollar limit.
Id. at 798 n. 2. The present case, like Beck, involves a first-party claim. Bear River is the
plaintiffs insurer. It has agreed to pay claims submitted to it by its insured for losses suffered
by the insured.
Like parties to all contracts other than employment contracts, an insurer and its insured
have parallel obligations to perform their contract in good faith. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). In Beck, the Utah Supreme Court explained that:
The implied obligation of good faith performance contemplates,
at the very least, that the insurer will diligently investigate the
facts to enable it to determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly
evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly and
reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim. Id.
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In the present matter, evidence establishes that Bear River fully discharged the obligations set
forth in Beck by: 1) diligently obtaining the information necessary to determine whether
plaintiff s PIP claims were valid; 2) properly evaluating those claims; and 3) promptly paying
the appropriate benefit amounts upon receipt of the information necessary to calculate the
benefits that were due.
It is well settled in Utah that, "when a claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled
to debate it, whether the debate concerns a matter of fact or law." Hill v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 829 P.2d 142,147 (Utah App. 1992). In the words of the Utah Supreme Court:
It would not comport with our ideas of either law or justice to
prevent any party who entertains bona fide questions about his
legal obligations from seeking adjudication thereon in the courts.
Western Cas. & Surety Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423,427 (Utah
1980). Thus, "when an insured's claim is fairly debatable, the
insurer is entitled to debate it and cannot be held to have
breached the implied covenant if it chooses to do so." Billings v.
Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1996).
In Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah
Court of Appeals held that there can be no first-party insurance bad faith, as a matter of law,
if the claim is fairly debatable. The court stated:
If the evidence presented creates a factual issue as to the claim's
validity, there exists a debatable reason for denial, thereby
legitimizing the denial of the claim, and eliminating the bad faith
claim. "When a claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled
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to debate it, whether the debate concerned a matter of fact or law.
Id
Callioux holds that when an issue is fairly debatable, an insurance company is entitled
to debate it. Further, the insurance company cannot be found to have acted in bad faith for
debating coverage. The facts of Callioux are instructive on this issue. Callioux filed a claim
with his insurer, Progressive, for the total loss of his Jeep which he claimed had gone "into
an uncontrollable skid, rolled down a hill, and subsequently burned." Id. At 839. Progressive
denied the claim because its investigation indicated "the loss was of incendiary origin,
occurring by or at the direction of David Callioux." Id. Callioux was eventually charged with
arson and attempt to defraud an insurer. He was acquitted of the criminal charges, and
Progressive paid the first-party claim in full after the judgment of acquittal. Callioux then
sued Progressive on various theories, including "bad faith denial of a first-party insurance
claim." Id. The trial court granted Progressive's motion for summary judgment, and Callioux
appealed. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed as indicated above. The court concluded that
Callioux's claim was "fairly debatable" as evidenced by the facts, and, therefore, bad faith
could not have established on the part of Progressive. Accordingly, Progressive was entitled
to summary judgment.
The same principle applies in the instant case. The plaintiff was involved in an
automobile accident on November 8, 1995, with Daniel Broadbent. Bear River, as the
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plaintiffs PIP insurer, requested that the plaintiff undergo an IME with Dr. Stephen Marble.
After a review of the plaintiffs history, medical records, and after performing a thorough
physical examination, Dr. Marble prepared a report regarding his findings. (R. 61 -67). In his
report, Dr. Marble stated as follows:
By the time Mr. Prince presented to Dr. Howard for chiropractic
care, he would have been considered presenting with a
complicated spine injury, owing to the delay in treatment
initiation. As such, a maximum of 12 weeks of chiropractic care
could have been justified. I do not think that the chiropractic
care exceeding 12 weeks was medically necessary. No further
chiropractic care should continue. The chiropractic care has been
palliative rather than curative. The patient was only getting up
to two days of pain relief with these treatments, but there has
been no long-term benefit. Following such a whiplash injury, a
multi-disciplinary consultation should have been obtained within
12 weeks from treatment initiation, rather than waiting six
months, as was the case here. (R. 66).
According to Dr. Marble's report, chiropractic care exceeding 12 weeks was not
medically necessary. Based on this fact, Bear River discontinued the payment of PIP benefits
after the 12-week cutoff period. (R. 53-54). Bear River relied on the IME report of Dr.
Marble to determine whether or not plaintiffs medical expenses were reasonable and
necessary. Based on the report, it made a determination as to when necessary expenses had
ceased. Bear River had a right to rely on Dr. Marble's report, and did so in good faith.
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The evidence contained in Dr. Marble's report creates a factual issue as to the validity
of plaintiffs claims. Bear River had a clear debatable reason for denial of plaintiff s benefits.
As such, plaintiffs claims against Bear River for bad faith must fail.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR
FRAUD
The trial court correctly held that the plaintiff failed to plead fraud with particularity

in his complaint, and correctly determined that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the elements of
fraud in the underlying case. As such, this Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of
plaintiffs fraud claim.
A.

The Plaintiff Failed to Plead Fraud with Particularity.

The plaintiff did not plead fraud with particularity in his complaint. As such, the trial
court was correct in dismissing plaintiffs claim for fraud.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides, "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." In Heathman
v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990 (Utah 1962), the trial court dismissed plaintiffs claims of fraud,
conspiracy and negligence because the basic facts upon which the allegations were based were
not stated with particularity, even though the plaintiff had attempted to plead fraud in a 33page amended complaint. Id. at 991. The Heathman court upheld the trial court's dismissal
because:
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It is to be noted that the terms "fraud," "conspiracy" and "negligence" are but
general accusations in the nature of conclusions of the pleader. They will not
stand against a motion to dismiss on that ground. The basic facts must be set
forth with sufficient particularity to show what facts are claimed to constitute
such charges.
Id. at 991. See also Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 973 (Utah 1982) (stating
that the purpose of Rule 9(b)'s requirement "dictates that it reach all circumstances where the
pleader alleges the kind of misrepresentations, omissions, or other deceptions covered by the
term "fraud" in its broadest dimension.")
Plaintiff failed to plead fraud with particularity. His fraud claim consisted of a few
conclusory averments. These averments do not satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule
9. See Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b); Heathman, 372 P.2d at 990; Williams, 656 P.2d at 966.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs cause of
action for fraud.
B.

The Elements for a Cause of Action for Fraud Have
Not Been Satisfied.

In order to make a successful claim for fraud, the following elements must be met: 1)
a representation must be made; 2) concerning a presently existing material fact; 3) which is
false; 4) which the representor (1) knew to be false or (2) made recklessly knowing he had
insufficient information to base the representation; 5) for the purpose of inducing the other
party to act upon it; 6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity;
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7) relied upon it; 8) and was thereby induced to act; 9) to his injury and damage. Crookston
v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). In Utah, fraud must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Bear River committed fraud, as Bear River allegedly represented
to the plaintiff that he was not entitled to the full $3,000 limit of PIP expenses. It is disputed
whether or not this representation made by Bear River was false. Bear River to this day
contends that the plaintiff was not entitled to reimbursement for his PIP expenses beyond 12
weeks of treatment. Bear River bases this representation upon the independent medical
evaluation conducted by Dr. Marble. Accordingly, the representation made by Bear River
was, and is not, fraudulent.
Further, there is no evidence to suggest that Bear River informed the plaintiff that he
was not entitled to reimbursement for PIP expenses beyond 12 weeks of treatment to induce
any form of action. Similarly, there is no evidence that the plaintiff relied on Bear River's
statement or that he altered in any way his medical treatment. Finally, there is no evidence
to support the fact that the plaintiff was injured and/or suffered any damages as a result of
Bear River's denial of PIP coverage. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in dismissing
the plaintiffs claims for fraud.
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VII.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
In order to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the

following elements must be met: 1) the defendant must intentionally engage in conduct toward
the plaintiff which is considered outrageous and intolerable in that it offends generally
accepted standards of decency and morality; 2) defendant must engage in this conduct with
the purpose of inflicting emotional distress or under the circumstances where any reasonable
person would have known such was the result; and 3) severe emotional distress must have
resulted from defendant's conduct. See Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (Utah 1961).
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Bear River intentionally inflicted emotional
distress upon the plaintiff by discontinuing PIP payments. The complaint does not allege the
details of the "emotional distress" which the plaintiff allegedly suffered.
As was previously discussed, a recognized standard for payment of PIP benefits exists
throughout Utah as well as the United States. PIP insurers are required to pay PIP benefits
to their insureds for "the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, xray, dental rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing
services, not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person." U.C.A. § 31A-22-307 (emphasis added).
Bear River determined the amount of reasonable and necessary PIP expenses in this matter
through the independent evaluation performed by Dr. Marble. Once Dr. Marble prepared his
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report, Bear River utilized his opinion and discontinued benefits after a total of $ 1,921.34 had
been paid.
There is no evidence whatsoever that Bear River's conduct could be considered
"outrageous". Bear River thoroughly investigated plaintiffs claim, hired an independent
physician to perform an evaluation, and made its decision based upon such independent
evidence. The fact that Bear River found it appropriate to discontinue plaintiffs PIP benefits
does not offend the standards of decency and morality recognized in Utah or throughout the
nation. There is no evidence whatsoever to establish that plaintiff suffered any distress, let
alone severe distress in this matter. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's
dismissal of plaintiff s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY PROHIBITED THE PLAINTIFF FROM
AMENDING HIS COMPLAINT
Granting of leave to amend is within the broad discretion of the trial court. The Utah
Court of Appeals has held that when determining whether or not to allow a party to amend its
complaint, courts should review factors such as timeliness, the reason for delay and prejudice
to the parties. Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768 (Utah App. 1998). In the present case,
the trial court was correct not to allow plaintiff to amend his complaint for the numerous
reasons which will be discussed below.

30

A.

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint Sought to Revive
Causes of Action That Had Already Been Dismissed.

The plaintiff filed his complaint in this matter on August 11, 1997. (R. 1-8). In that
complaint, the plaintiff alleged causes of action against Bear River for breach of insurance
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, fraud, and the tort of violation of public policy embodied in the No-Fault
Insurance Act. (R. 1-8). On January 23,1998, Bear River filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment asking the court to dismiss all of plaintiffs claims except that for breach of
contract. Briefs were submitted on the matter and oral argument was heard. On April 1,
1998, the trial court signed an order granting defendant's motion for a partial summary
judgment and dismissed all of plaintiff s claims except for that of breach of contract. (R. 18993). In its order, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that "Utah Code Annotated §
31 A-22-307 imposes a 'reasonable and necessary' standard for determining the payment of
PIP benefits." (R. 191). The trial court concluded that such a reasonable and necessary
standard does not need to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the trial court
found that "the legislature has used the term advisedly and the plaintiff must prove 'necessary'
by a preponderance of the evidence. Further, the term 'necessary' means something more
than non-fraudulent claims." (R. 191).
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The trial court also ruled that "when a claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled
to debate it, whether the debate concerns a matter of fact or law". (R. 192). The trial court
ruled that plaintiffs claims in this matter were fairly debatable as a matter of law, and
therefore plaintiffs claims for bad faith breach of fiduciary duty and fraud were dismissed
with prejudice. (R. 192).
After the case was transferred from Judge Thorne to Judge Dever, the plaintiff sought
leave from the court to amend his complaint. Upon even a brief review of the proposed
amended complaint, it was clear that the amended complaint did nothing more than reallege
the causes of action which had already been dismissed as a matter of law by Judge Thorne and
attempt to turn such causes of action into a class action lawsuit.
Plaintiff s amended complaint sought declaratory reliefthat Bear River was not entitled
to have an IME performed and was not allowed to apply the "reasonable and necessary"
standard for determination of entitlement to PIP benefits. Through its order on defendant's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the trial court had already ruled on this issue as a
matter of law. The trial court's order was clear, stating "Section 31A-22-307 imposes a
'reasonable and necessary' standard for determining the payment of PIP benefits." (R. 191).
This standard had been applied by the trial court, the Utah no-fault statute, and case law
throughout Utah as well as the United States. For that reason, plaintiffs claims for breach
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of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, infliction of emotional distress,
and violation of the tort of public policy were dismissed. The plaintiff should not be allowed
to revive these causes of action which clearly have no basis in fact or law. Couching this
lawsuit in terms of a class action and bringing Dr. Marble, the IME physician, added nothing
to plaintiffs case. Therefore, plaintiffs claims are meritless and have no basis in law. Judge
Dever recognized this fact and precluded the plaintiff from amending his complaint. Bear
River would urge this Court to affirm such a ruling.
B.

A Party Cannot Amend its Complaint Once a Final
Order Has Been Issued.

After Bear River's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was granted, the only claim
which remained in the underlying lawsuit was plaintiffs claim for breach of contract. On
February 16, 2000, Bear River filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss
plaintiffs breach of contract claim as the full policy limits of plaintiff s PIP policy had been
paid. (R. 202-03). Briefs were submitted by both parties but no argument was heard. Bear
River's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied without explanation. (R. 234). Based on
the fact that PIP payments in the amount of the policy limit had been paid, Bear River filed
a Motion for Determination of Attorneys' Fees Owed. (R. 239-40). On October 2,2000, the
trial court entered a Minute Entry decision, ruling that the plaintiff was entitled to interest on
$1,100 from August 7, 1997 to April 16, 1998, but was not entitled to the payment of
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attorney's fees. (R. 268-69). The court stated in its Minute Entry that the Minute Entry will
"constitute the final order of the court." (R. 268). On October 18, 2000, Bear River sent
plaintiffs counsel a check in the amount of $ 145.17 constituting interest owed pursuant to the
trial court's Minute Entry.
Utah courts have adopted the majority rule that an order of dismissal is a final
adjudication, and thereafter, a plaintiff may not file an amended complaint. Nichols v. State
of Utah, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976). As such, once an action has been dismissed and a final
adjudication rendered, the plaintiff may not file an amended complaint. Steiner v. State of
Utah, 495 P.2d 809 (Utah 1972).
In the present case, the trial court issued a Minute Entry which stated that the Minute
Entry will "constitute the final order of the court." (R. 268-269). This Minute Entry
constituted a final order of dismissal. At the time the plaintiff filed his motion to amend the
complaint, all of the pending issues had been decided and Bear River had paid the amounts
ordered by the trial court. As such, pursuant to the majority rule, the trial court correctly ruled
that the plaintiff could not be allowed to amend his complaint.
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C.

Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Was Untimely.

The Utah Court of Appeals has held that when considering a motion to amend, the
timeliness of the motion, the moving party's reason for the delay, and the resulting prejudice
to the responding party must be considered. Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768 (Utah
App. 1998). In the Tenth Circuit, untimeliness alone is a sufficient reason to deny leave to
amend. First City Bank v. Air Capital Aircraft Sales, 820 F.2d 1127, 1133 (10th Cir. 1987).
On several occasions, the Tenth Circuit has affirmed the district court's refusal to permit
further amendments to the pleadings "where the party seeking amendment knows or should
have known of the facts upon which the proposed amendment is based but fails to include
them in the original complaint." Pallottino v. City of Rio Rancho, 31 F.3d 1023, 1027 (10th
Cir. 1994).
The plaintiff knew about the allegations underlying its proposed amendment long
before November 9, 2000. As discussed above, plaintiffs proposed amended complaint did
nothing more than reallege the causes of action which were previously dismissed by the trial
court, except that he attempts to couch the proposed amended complaint in terms of a class
action lawsuit. Plaintiffs motion to amend was filed late in the suit, as all issues had already
been resolved.
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The Utah Court of Appeals has consistently upheld a trial court's denial of a motion
to amend if the amendment is sought late in the course of litigation, if the movement was
aware of the facts underlying the proposed amendment long before its filing, and if there is
no adequate explanation for the delay. Atcitty v. Board of Education of San Juan County
School District, 967 P.2d 1261 (Utah App. 1998). In the present case, the plaintiff was aware
of the "new issues" raised in the amended complaint long before his motion was filed. There
was no justifiable reason for the delay, and the plaintiff makes no attempt to set forth any
explanation as to why he waited until all issues were resolved in this case before filing an
amended complaint. Instead, it is apparent that the plaintiff recognized that this matter had
essentially been dismissed, and sought one last attempt to revive the meritless causes of action
which were dismissed nearly three years prior.
D.

The Plaintiffs Amended Complaint Was Futile.

The United States Supreme Court has held that one of the reasons which will justify
the denial of leave to amend is "futility of amendment". Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,182,
83 S.Ct. 227 (1962), cited in Sooner Products Company v. McBride, 708 F.2d 510 (10th Cir.
1983).
Plaintiffs proposed amended complaint essentially sought causes of action for bad
faith, fraud, punitive damages, and a declaratory judgment that Bear River is not entitled to
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obtain an independent medical evaluation or apply the reasonable and necessary standard set
forth in the no-fault statute when determining an insured's entitlement to PIP benefits. As
previously discussed, these causes of action were ruled upon by the trial court. Therefore, this
Court should affirm the trial court's decision not to allow plaintiff to amend his complaint.
E.

An Amended Complaint Would Have Unfairly
Prejudiced the Defendant

Undue prejudice is yet another basis for denying the plaintiffs motion to amend. If
a defendant will suffer undue prejudice, the plaintiff should not be allowed to amend his
complaint. Castleglen, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 984 F.2d 1571, 1584-1585 (10th Cir.
1993). Plaintiffs proposed amended complaint is an attempt to circumvent the trial court's
prior rulings. At the time the plaintiff filed his motion to amend, all issues in this case had
been decided and, based on the trial court's previous Minute Entry, the matter was dismissed.
Allowing the plaintiff to amend his complaint, directly overrules all prior decisions of the trial
court and requires Bear River to incur the significant expenses of defending a meritless class
action suit. Accordingly, Bear River asks that this Court to affirm the trial court's refusal to
allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint.
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X.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE PLAINTIFF'S
ENTITLEMENT TO ATTORNEY'S FEES
The trial court held that although Bear River was the prevailing party on each of its

motions for summary judgment, and although Bear River paid the full amount of PIP benefits
owed, pursuant to the No-Fault statute, the plaintiff was entitled to attorney' s fees. However,
the trial court also ruled and ordered that such attorney's fees be limited to the breach of
contract claim. The trial court found that the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees for
memoranda prepared and arguments submitted on the "reasonable and necessary" standard
for determination of PIP expenses. The court noted that the only actions taken by plaintiffs
counsel in pursuit of PIP payment was the filing of the portion of the Complaint dealing with
the breach of contract action. It is Bear River's position that the trial court's ruling was
appropriate in this matter.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a party is entitled only to attorney's fees
resulting from its principle cause of action for which there is a contractual or statutory
obligation for such fees. Utah Farm Production Credit Association vs. Cox, 627 P.2d, 62,
(Utah, 1981). The Utah Supreme Court has required a party seeking attorney's fees
accordingly to allocate its request for fees according to its underlying claim. The party must
differentiate between the fees and the time expended for 1) successful claims for which there
may be an entitlement to attorney's fees; 2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have
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been an entitlement to attorney's fees had the claims been successful; and 3) claims for which
there is no entitlement for attorney's fees. A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating vs. Aspen
Construction, 977, P.2d at 526.
For example, in Foote vs. Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah, 1998), real estate purchasers
brought an action against the vendors and listing agent alleging a breach of a real estate
contract. After the purchasers settled with the listing agent, the district court awarded the
purchasers nominal damages and attorney's fees. The vendors then appealed. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, and certiorari was granted to the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme
Court reversed in part however, regarding the issue of attorney's fees, finding that the trial
court abused its discretion in awarding the full amount of requested of attorney's fees to the
purchasers. The Utah Supreme Court determined that the purchasers had sought attorney's
fees relating to the non-contract claims against the vendors. The Supreme Court determined
"it would violate the contract to require the defaulting party to pay attorney's fees accrued in
pursuing these claims, when the work done did not tangibly relate to the breach of contract
claim as welP'.Id. The Supreme Court further determined that "when a plaintiff has a
substantial claim against one defendant, he should not have a free ride to assert claims against
other defendants with the expectations that the target defendant will end up paying all
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attorney's fees, even when those claims factually relate to claims for which the plaintiff may
be entitled to attorney's fees." Id. at 56.
The present case is analogous to the Foote case. The plaintiff originally filed a cause
of action against Bear River for breach of contract, bad faith, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, fraud, and the tort of violation of public policy embodied in the No Fault
Insurance Act. Each of the claims, but for the breach of contract action, was dismissed by
the trial court. Bear River was accordingly the prevailing party on each of those claims.
Further, attorney's fees are not available under any of the claims other than that of breach of
contract, pursuant to section 31A-22-309 of the Utah Code. As such, the plaintiff is not
entitled to attorney's fees for the pursuit of these other causes of action.
The plaintiff did nothing to pursue his cause of action for breach of contract in the
underlying case. Other than filing the original complaint, there was no discovery, motions,
memoranda, or arguments presented to the trial court regarding the breach of contract claim.
Because Bear River paid the full PIP limit, such attorney's fees could never have arisen in the
underlying case. Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled and ordered that an award of
attorney's fees be limited to the breach of contract claim, and limited that amount to $450.00,
ie. the amount incurred in drafting the original complaint. Such an award fairly compensates
the plaintiff and should be upheld by this Court.
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XL

THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THIS
APPEAL
Bear River recognizes that attorney's fees are available on appeal. However, such fees

are not warranted for the plaintiff in this case. Instead, it is the defendant who is justified in
asking for fees.
Plaintiffs appeal is meritless. As such, Bear River should be awarded the attorney's
fees that have been generated in having to defend such a frivolous appeal. The plaintiff has
already had two bites at the apple to argue his meritless position at the trial court level. Both
times, the plaintiff was defeated. In fact, Bear River even filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions
in an attempt to convey to counsel and the court how frivolous the plaintiffs claims truly
were. The plaintiff has no basis in law or fact for bringing his claims for bad faith, breach of
contract, fraud, infliction of emotional distress, etc. against Bear River. The plaintiff has
attempted to create new law in this case, and by doing so, has ignored the existing case law,
statutory provisions and contract language that govern. This Court should not reward the
plaintiff for such conduct through an award of attorney's fees. Instead, such conduct should
be deterred, and Bear River should be compensated for having to defend this matter a third
time.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court has ruled on the issues presented in this appeal two times. Both Judge
Thorne and Judge Dever concluded that the plaintiffs claims have no merit. Both judges
agreed that Bear River applied the correct "reasonable and necessary" standard for
determining the payment of PIP benefits, and both concluded that plaintiffs claims in this
matter were fairly debatable as a matter of law, and therefore dismissed with prejudice
plaintiffs claims for bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty and fraud.
The trial court also properly held that the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees
for memoranda prepared and arguments submitted on the "reasonable and necessary" standard
for determination of PIP expenses as he did not succeed on this issue. As such, only
attorney's fees generated in the pursuit of PIP payment were justified. Because the only
actions taken to pursue the payment of PIP benefits was the filing of the portion of the
Complaint dealing with the breach of contract action, the trial court's award of $450.00 in
attorney's fees was reasonable.
The trial court in the underlying case was just, reasonable and correct in all of its
rulings. As such, Bear River respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's
rulings granting Bear River's motion for summary judgment, denying plaintiffs motion to
amend, and awarding the plaintiff $450.00 in attorney's fees. Bear River would also ask that
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this Court deny plaintiffs request for attorney's fees on appeal, and instead, award Bear River
its attorney's fees in having to defend this meritless appeal.
DATED this Jl_ daY of October, 2001.

STRONG & HANNI

Kristin A. VanOrman
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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